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1　：Introduction
　　This　study　examines　the　effects　of　televised　political　advertisements　in
current　U．S．　politics　and　assesses　their　advantages　and　disadvantages．
Televised　political　commercials　are　unique　channels　of　communication，　and
they　have　taken　on　increasing　importance　in　both　primary　and　general
elections　in　America．　They　have　become　institutionalized　events　of　the
American　electoral　process　l）ecause　of　the　widespread　reach　of　television
airwaves（Diamond　and　Bates，1992；Jamieson，1996）．　Political　advertising
can　be　a　potent　weapon　fbr　candidates，　not　only　fbr　publicizing　their　names
but　also　fbr　setting　the　campaign　agenda．　Indeed，　modern　political
advertising　has　had　systematic　effects　on　the　genera1　strategy　of　campaigns，
the　overall　styles　of　electoral　politics，　the　kinds　of　candidates　chosen，　and
the　shifting　sources　of　their　support（Diamond　and　Bates，1992）．
　　Although　politicians　and　media　pay　much　attention　to　political
advertising，　several　studies　find　that　advertising　appeals　are　sometimes
secondary　because　a　large　volume　of　other　political　inf（）rmation　by　the
media　dilutes　the　effects　of　the　spots．　This　tendency　is　most　apparent　in　the
presidential　campaign　in　which　the　media　provides　plenty　of　information，
and　the　effects　of　political　advertisements　are　hard　to　isolate．　In　addition，
when　viewers　are　inundated　by　the　lurid　political　messages，　their　”defense”
against　such　advertisements　is　mobilized，　and　they　tend　to　stop　paying
attention　to　them（Garramone，1984；Robinson，1981；Merrit，1984，
Johnson－Carteee　and　Copeland，1991；Owen，1991）．　The　positive　effects　of
political　advertisements　are　exaggerated，　and　these　spots　should　not　to　be　a
be－all　and　end－all　of　campaign　strategy．　The　results　of　overflowing　political
advertising　are　costly　campaigns，　depressed　voting　participation，
u喚substantiated　attacks，　mercenary　political　consultants，　and　a　citizenry
disconnected　from　its　representatives．　Thus，　refbmls，　such　as　spending　limits
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and　tighter　fb】㎜at　regulations，　are　discussed　by　scholars　and　critiques，　but
they　are　so　far　dif行cult　to　be　enfbrced．
H：Development　and　Patterns　of　Televised　Candidate　Advertisements
　　The　development　of　televised　political　advertisements　in　the　U．S．　politics
has　coincided　with　the　growth　of　the　television　industry．　The　first　political
spots　on　television　were　broadcast　during　Dwight　Eisenhower，s　l952
presidential　election，　and　it　was　soon　discovered　that　political　ads　are
particularly　effective　in　positioning　the　candidates　against　their　oPPonents．
Eisenhower　Answers　America　consisted　of　several　spots　in　which　the
candidate　answered　questions丘om　ordinary　citizens．　To　current　viewers，　the
early　effbrts　of　his　campaigns　seem　unpolished　and　unappealing，　especially
when　compared　with　the　slick　campaign　ads　produced　recently．　However，
the　spots　contained　content　similar　to　today’s　advertisements．　For　example　in
l952，　discontented　feelings　concerning　commodity　price　increases　and
national　security　were　used　effectively　to　attack　the　Democratic　candidate
Adlai　Stevenson（Diamond　and　Bates，1992）．
　　By　l960，　it　was　clear　to　all　that　television　could”make　or　break”a
candidate　because　of　the　sharply　increased　popularity　of　television．　After　the
success　of　one　of　the　most　telegenic　politicians，　John　F．　Kennedy，　more　than
one　third　of　the　national　candidates，　budgets　was　devoted　to　televised
advertising．　Also，　this　period　was　the　beginning　of　an　era　where　the　image
and　ability　to　manipulate　the　image　of　a　candidate　became　the　center　of　the
campaign　strategy（Jamieson，1996）．
　　In　the　l　964　presidential　campaign，　a　very　elaborate　and　controversial
television　spot，㎞own　as　the”Daisy，”became　famous　overnight．　It　starts
with　a　little　girl　peacefUlly　plucking　the　petals丘om　a　daisy，　counting　from
one　to　nine．　Just　as　she　reaches　the　number　ten，　the　spot　shows　a　close－up　of
her　eye，　and　airs　a　booming　voice．　The　voice　now　counts　down：”Ten，　nine，
eight，　seven．．．”At　the　end　of　the　countdown，　the　flash　of　an　atomic
explosion　refiects　in　the　little　girl’s　eye．　Then，　we　hear　president　Johnson’　s
voice　saying：”These　are　the　stakes－to　make　a　world　in　which　all　Godls
children　can　live　or　to　go　into　the　dark．　We　must　love　each　other　or　we　must
die．”Avoice－over　then　states：”Vote　for　President　Johnson　on　November　3．
The　stakes　are　too　high　fbr　you　to　stay　home”（Diamond　and　Bates，1992）．
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The　spot　attempted　to　attack　the　hawkish　Republican　contender，　Barry
Goldwater，　implying　tllat　Goldwater　might　lead　America　into　a　nuclear　war
with　Soviet　Union．　Arguably，　the”Daisy”is　the　most　negative　political
advertisement　in　American　political　history．
　　By　the　1970s，　television　ads　amounted　to　nearly　two　thirds　of　an　average
political　campaign　budget（Jamieson，1996）．　One　of　the　leading　US　political
communication　scholars，　Thomas　Patterson，　notes　that　in　current　political
campaigns，　political　spots　play　fUndamental　roles　in　elections，　and　political
parties，　which　had　fUnctioned　as　the　vital　institutions　to　select　and　nominate
candidates，　began　to　take　a　backseat（Patterson，1994）．　According　to
Patterson，　the　l　976　presidential　election　was　the　watershed　of　media　politics，
and　it　was　the　beginning　of　the°，mass　media　election”（Patterson，1980）．
During　the　1976　presidential　campaign，　nationally　unknown　candidate
Jimmy　Carter　effectively　employed　political　advertising，　received　the
Democratic　party　nomination，　and　finally　rose　to　the　presidency．　Patterson
noted：”the　media，s　attention　helps　to　turn　a　Carter　boom　let　into　a
l）andwagon”（Patterson，1994，41）．　Since　then，　the　media　has　become　the
center　ofpolitical　recnlitments（Kefbe1，1995）．
　　In　the　recent”mass　media　elections，”candidate　advertising　strategies　have
similar　patterns．　Diamonds　and　Bates　have　identified　fbur　phases　that
correspond　to　candidate　advertising　strategies　in　presidential　elections．　Early
in　a　campaign，　candidates　are　concemed　with　developing　recognition　and
creating　a　positive　image，　so　they　nm”identification”spots．　These　ads　are
fbllowed　by　an”argument”spot　in　which　the　candidates　attempt　to　convey
what　they　stand　for　to　the　public．　Candidates　can　use　these　commercials　for
developing　emotional　appeals　or　fbr　conveying　their　policy　positions．　Next，
”attack”spots　highlight　the　opponents，　weak　points．　In　the　fburth　and　final
phase，　candidates　conclude　their　campaign　advertising　appeals　by　presenting
their　visions　of　the　fate　of　the　nation．　In　recent　presidential　elections，　the
candidates’advertising　strategies，　while　employing　different　tactics，
essentially　conformed　to　these　general　patterns（Diamond　and　Bates，1992）．
　　Also，　Hagstrom　and　Guslkind　have　analyzed　375　political　commercials
丘om　14　Senate　and　gubematorial　races．　They　conclude　that　there　were　three
types　of　political　ads：those　that”acquaint　voters　with　the　candidate，s
personality　and　background，’l　those　that，’extol　his　or　her　record　or　plans鱒，
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and　those　that”tear　apart　the　opponent”（Hagstrom　and　Guslkind，1986）．
These　types　of　ads　correspond　with　the　campaign　advertising　phases
identified　by　Diamond　and　Bates．
　　One　great　difference　between　the　l　950－70　political　advertisements　and
current　spots　is　that　the　number　of　negative　ads　has　increased．　Traditionally，
challengers’campaigns　were　often　underfinanced；therefbre，　challengers
tumed　to　negative　ads　in　order　to　crack　the　incumbents，　public　image．　Also，
negative　ads　tended　to　be　aired　near　the　end　of　the　political　race　to　attack　the
opponent　at　the　final　stage．　However，　after　the　l　980s，　Montague　Kem　finds
two　different　tendencies　conceming　the　use　of　negative　ads．　First，　not　only
challengers　but　also　incumbents　now丘equently　use　negative　ads．　Secondly，
negative　attacks　often　have　begun　early　to　damage　the　opponents丘om　the
outset　of　a　campaign．　Thus，　she　concludes　that　modem　negative　political
advertising　has　become　a　regular　American　practice（Kem，1989）．
　　During　these　phases，　political　candidates　often　employ　comparative
political　advertising　strategies　as　a　means　of　communicating　negative
infbmlation　about　a　candidate’s　opponent　to　voters　while　avoiding　the　stigma
attached　to　purely　negative曾曾attack”advertising（Pfau　et　al．，1990；Salmore
and　Salmore，1989）．　Direct　comparative　advertising　addresses　di脆rent
beliefs　of　candidates　and　differentiates　sponsor，s　views　rather　than　attacking
opponents，　misstatements，　financial　or　marital　scandals，　broken　promises．
The　sponsoring　candidate　claims　superiority　over　the　targeted　candidate，
typically　based　on　both　candidatesl　issue　positions，　experience，　or　voting
records．　In　this　way，　candidates　achieve　the　goal　of　highlighting　their　cleaner
images　by　contrasting　it　with　those　of　opponents　who　resort　to　direct
negative　attacks．　Thus，　in　contrast　to　ordinary　negative　advertising，　direct
comparative　advertising　conveys　a　less　malicious　impression　to　voters　in　its
format　and　appearance（Pinkleton，1997；Hill，1989；Johnson－Cartee　and
Copeland，1991；Merritt，1984）．
　　In　the　l　996　campaign，　political　analysts　and　observers　find　that　a　new
type　of　political　advertisement　came　to　the　public　attention．　Joumalist　Joe
Klein　claims　that　the　Clinton　1996　campaign　takes　negative　ads　to　a　new
artistic　level，　making　them　seem　positive．　He　points　out　an　ad　attacking　on
Bob　Dole　which　is　sandwiched　betWeen　heart－warming　spots　of　president
Clinton　with　dying　children　and　calls　it”the　Empathic　Negatives．”
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According　to　Klein，　American　people　are曾曾sick　to　death　of　bickering，
hyperbole　and　partisanship，”and　they　want”comity，　inspiration　and
specifies．”In　this　way，　Clinton曹s”human　interest”attack　ads　fit　American
citizensl　sentiments　and　thus，　Dole’s　media　advisor　had　a　difficult　task
responding　to　the　ads（Klein，1996）．
皿：The　Emects　of　Politica垂Adver髄sing
The　greatest　advantage　of　the　televised　political　commercial　is　the　power
to　command　a　1arge　audience．　This　observation　is　supported　by　the　fact　that
daily　television　viewing　time　has　been　shown　to　be　the　primary　detemminant
of　individuals　noticing　political　ads（Atkin，　Bowen，　Nayman，　and　Sheinkopf，
1993）．With　this　widespread　accessibility，　political　spots　can　potentially
provide　the　electorate　with』vital　infbrmation　about　issues　and　perhaps
exercise　influences　on　individual　voting　preference．　Political　commercials
are　especially　an　important　source　of　information　for　voters　who　have　only
moderate　or　very　low　interest　in　these　elections．　These　voters　have　lower
levels　of　knowledge　about　candidates　and　issues，　and　they　tend　to　take　fewer
cues丘om　political　parties　than　those　who　are　highly　interested　and　involved
in　the　campaign．　Highly　interested　voters　tend　to　seek　out　campaign
information　from　multiple　media　sources，　while　those　less　concemed　about
politics　use　more　limited　resources．　Thus，　ads　have　a　greater　potential　fbr
influencing　the　politically　uninvolved　and　uninterested（Atkin，　Bowen，
Nayman，　and　Sheinkopf，1993）．
　　Lawrence　Bowen　finds　that　the　impact　of　political　advertising　is　dif〔brent
according　to　the　time　when　a　voter　decides　their　choices．　Those　who　decide
during　the　campaign　typically　make　use　of　available　information　fヒom　a
variety　of　sources．　Political　advertising　is　only　one　of　them，　and　its　impact　is
limited．　However，”late　deciders，”who　come　to　a　decision　during　the　waning
hours　of　the　campaign　are　more　1ikely　to　be　affected　by　the　candidates，監ast－
minute　advertising　blitz．　According　to　Bowen，　in　an　exit－poll　survey　of　414
Seattle　area　voters　fbr　the　l992　US　senatorial　race，102　voters　were
identified　as，’late　deciders．”They　were　more　l∬（ely　to　mention　that　political
advertising　helped　them　decide．　In　addition，”late　deciders”were　better　able
to　recall　and　identifシspecific　political　ads　than　those　who　decided　either
early　or　during　the　campaign（Bowen，1994）．
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　　According　to　the　study　of　Patterson　and　McClure，　voters　leam　more　issue
information　from　television　spots　than　from　television　news　in　presidential
races．　They　conducted　research　during　the　1972　election　and　concluded　that
the　effect　of　spots　exceeded　that　of　television　news（Patterson　and　McClure，
1976）．A　more　recent　research　by　Zhao　and　Chaffee，　however，　shows　several
contradicting　results．　In　their　research，　the　effects　of　advertisements　are　less
than　those　of　news，　and　sometimes　they　are　insignificant．　But　in　a　hotly
contested　ideological　race，　the　e脆ct　of　campaign　ads　is　more　significant
than　that　of　TV　news（Zhao　and　Chaffee，1995）．
　　Advertising　may　be　more　effective　in　low－level　and　local　campaigns，
which　are　considered　low－visibility　races．　Rothschild　and　Ray　tested　the
effectiveness　of　political　advertising　for　high－　and　low－involvement　races　in
an　experimental　setting　and　discovered　that　the　effectiveness　of　political
adve而sing　is　strongest　in　low－information，　low－involvement　campaigns
such　as　primary　elections，　nonpartisan　races，　and　races　fbr　state　positions．
These　elections　are　not　likely　to　be　covered　so　much　by　news　media，　and
voters　can　be　heavily　influenced　by　the　infbrmation　from　the　spots
（Rothschild　and　Ray，1974）．
　　Another　important　factor　of　political　spots　is　their　news－worthiness．
Campaign　ads　have　become　so　important　that　they　are　now　a　common
subj　ect　of　news　coverage　in　and　of　themselves．　Therefbre，　campaign
consultants　consider　political　spots　cost－effective　because　press　coverage
devoted　to　ads　makes　the　ads　more　influential．　Roger　Ailes，　George　H
Bush’s　communication　director　and　the　producer　of　the　controversial”Willie
Hortonll　spot，　I　elucidates：
There　is　so　much　focus　now　by　joumalistS　on出e曲血at・it・is・considered・a
major　event　of　the　campaign　when　you　have　a　press　conference　to　unveil
your　latest　ads．．．1　have　known　of　campaigns　that　have　made　ads　and　only
bought　one　spot　but　released　it　at　major　press　conferences　to　get　it　into　the
news．．．It雪s　b㏄ome　a伽ly　co㎜on惚cdc．（Ro血enberg，1990）
　　During　the　fbur　phases　described　by　Diamonds　and　Bates，　especially　f『om
the　second　to　the　last，　candidates　set　the　public　agenda．　This　is　sometimes
determined　by　the　opposing　candidates　campaigning　against　each　other．
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Research　shows　that　the　effect　of　a　political　advertisement　is　most　striking
when　both　campaigns　devote　a　considerable　portion　of　their　paid　advertising
to　the　same　issue．　In　addition，　there　is　considerable　evidence　that　candidates
shape　voters雪perceptions　most　effectively　when　their　campaigns　resonate
with　partisan　stereotypes　such　as　civil　rights，　environmental　issues　fbr
Democrats，　and　defense　issues　fbr　Republicans（Ansolabehere，　Behr，
Iyengar，1993）．
　　However，　findings丘om　several　cases　researched　by　political　scientists
suggest　that　the　positive　effects　of　advertising　in　presidential　elections　are
unclear　in　some　cases．　First，　during　presidential　campaigns，　the　media
generate　a　large　volume　of　political　infbrmation　quite　apart倉om　that
provided　in　candidate　spots．　Voters　are　highly　aware　of　candidates　and　often
form　concrete　attitUdes　about　them　fairly　early　in　the　campaign．　Secondly，
individuals’defenses　are　mobilized　against　candidates’obvious　attempts　to
win　their　votes（Patterson　and　McClure，1976）．
　　Even　during　the　l　988　Bush　campaign，　which　was　believed　as　one　of　the
most　negatire－spots－ridden　campaigns　in　history，　the　e脆ct　of　campaign
advertising　was　not　apparent．　Immediately　after　the　Republican　convention，
the　Bush　campaign　began　an　unrelenting　attack　on　Dukakisl　positions　on
major　issues，　his　record　as　governor　of　Massachusetts，　and　his　commitment
to　basic　American　values．　The　Bush　team’s”Boston　Hafbor，”2and”Willie
Horton”spots　are　considered　among　the　greatest　examples　of　negative
tactics　because　part　of　their　content　was　intentionally　made　erroneous　to
make　Dukakis　appear　incompetent　in　political　management．　Nonetheless，
the　Dukakis　campaign　failed　to　respond　directly　to　these　charges　fbr　over　a
month．　The　Dukakis’campaign　team　was　very　disorganized　and　Dukakis
himself　often　did　not　listen　to　advice　from　his　campaign　team（Jamieson，
1996）．Although　the　negative　attack　effect　has　been　reported　and　studied，　the
fall　of　Dukakis曾ratings，　however，　started　befbre　the　Bush　team　launched
their　negative　attacks．　A　CBS　News／New　York　Times　opinion　poll　showed
that　56％of　the　voters　perceived　Bush　as　attacking　Dukakis　throughout　the
campaign，　whereas　Dukakis　was　perceived　as　attacking　Bush　by　49％of　the
voters（Jo㎞son－Cartee，　Copeland，1991）．
　　While　political　ads　may　reach　the　uninterested　and　uninvolved，　there　is　no
guarantee　that　those　voters　will　be　receptive　to　spots．　In　fact，　there　is　some
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evidence　that　the　continual　barrage　of　ads　during　Presidential　elections
alienates　voters．　Atkin，　Bowen，　Nayman，　and　Sheinkopf　claim　that　people
avoid　candidate　ads　because　they　interfere　with　primetime　programming．
Moderate　exposure　to　ads　about　candidates　seems　to　produce　more　favorable
ratings　than　high　exposure，　although　there　is　some　evidence　to　the　contrary
（Atkin，　Bowen，　Nayman，　and　Sheinkopf，1993）．　According　to　Diana　Owen，
anumber　of　respondents　expressed　amoyance　at　the丘equency　in　which　ads
were　mn　during　the　l　984　and　1988　election　campaigns．　Most　of　these
respondents　reported　that　they　ignored　ads　when　they　appeared　on　television
（Owen，1991）．　Therefbre，　exposure　to　television　spots　is　not　necessarily
related　to　e脆ctive　political　advertising．
　　Another　disadvantage　of　political　ads　is　the　above－mentioned　negativity．
In　recent　years，　consultants　and　campaign　managers　have　been　increasingly
critical　of　attack　advertisements　that　attempt　to　discredit　a　candidates’
opponent　rather　than　promote　the　sponsoring　candidate　directly．　However，
except　fbr”adwatches，”there　is　no　established　system　that　checks　to
determine　whether　or　not　candidates　are　falsely　attacking　their　opponents．
The　right　to　advertising　is　protected　by　the　constitutional　guarantees　of　free
speech：Section　3150f　the　Communications　Act　of　l　934　clearly　fbrbids
censorship　of　political　broadcasts．　In　other　words，　the　ads　cannot　be　ba皿ed，
no　matter　how　untruthfU1　they　might　be．　In　addition，　the　Supreme　Court　has
said　that　because　the　television　media　is　not　allowed　to　censor　political
advertising，　stations　are　given　absolute　protection　from　libel　suits　as　the
result　of　the　dissemination　of　political　advertising（Farmers　Educational　and
Cooperative乙「nion・レ．　rzDA　Y，　Inc．，1959）．　This四non－censorship　Provision，’
is　apPlied　as　long　as　the　political　advertising　is　sponsored　by　a　legally
qualified　candidate．　A　number　of　states　have　campaign　falsity　statutes　to
forbid　the　declaration　of　false　statements　about　a　candidate　for　public　office；
however，　the　opportunities　to　enfbrce　such　laws　are　very　limited　because　of
their　conflict　with　the’”丘eedom　of　speech”（Johnson－Carteee　and　Copeland，
1991）．Many　campaigns　have　taken　advantage　of　these　facts．　As　a　result，
opposition　candidates　are　left　with　the　classic　remedy　of　retaliatory　free
speech．　Politicians　may　deliberately　lie　and　create　innuendoes　about　the
oPPonents’political　records　or　personal　qualifications　fbr　of臼ce．
　　Furthermore，　a　number　of　studies　conclude　that　negative　politica1
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advertising　is　a　high－risk　approach　because　it　may　damage　the　users’
popularity・Political　advertising　researchers　have　identified　three　possible
selfLdamaging　effects　as　the　result　of　using　negative　political　advertising：the
boomerang，　the　victim　syndrome，　and　the　double　impairment　effect．　A
boomerang　or　backlash　effect　is　the　unintended　consequence　of　a　negative
ad，　which　results　in　more　negative　feelings　toward　the　sponsor，　rather　than
toward　the　target（Garramone，1984）．　When　a　negative　ad　is　perceived　as
being　unfair　or　urゆstified，　then　the　ad　may　in　fact　create　a　phenomenon
㎞own　as　the”victim　s）mdrome．”　The　unfair　negative　ad　may　generate　more
positive　feelings　toward　the　target（Robinson，1981）．　Based　on　her　survey　in
southern　Califbrnia，　Sharyne　Merrit　concludes　that　negative　political
advertising　evokes　a　negative　affect　towards　both　the　targeted　opponent　and
the　sponsor．　According　to　her，血is　double　impairment　effect　is　conspicuous
when　used　by　a　minority　party　candidate（Merrit，1984）．
　　On　the　other　hand，　Ansolabehere，　Behr　and　Iyengar　find　that　negative　ads
are　more　memorable　than　positive　messages，　based　on　their　fbcus　group
research（Ansolabehere，　Behr　and　Iyengar，1993）．　Circumstances　sometimes
f（）rce　candidates　to　highlight　negative　messages　about　their　opponents．　Thus，
the　negativity　of　political　adverting　has　been　intensified　in　recent　years．　In
fact，　not　a　few　professional　politicians　and　their　advisors　take　for　granted　the
efficacy　of　negative　political　advertisement．　Moreover，　some　campaign
strategists　justify　attack　advertising　because　it　captures　more　media　attention
toward　the　candidates，　even　if　the　coverage　of　the　media　is　negative．　This
justification　is　closely　related　to　the　media　culture　of　the　United　States．
Kenneth　Khachigan，　a　senior　staff　member　of　the　Reagan－Bush　campaign
explains：
We，㎞polidcs，　are・compe血g　wi止a　real　issue　in　joumalism：the・fact止at
the　coverage，　especially　in　the　electronic　media，　has　been　on　the　sensationa1．
．．When　candidates　try　to　say　somethhlg　that　is　thought血1　or　substantiv6，
they　don’t　get　any　coverage．　Local　television　and　newspapers　are　dealing
With　the　more　exciting　elementS　of　the　world．．．．We　have　to　get　the　media’s
attention．　Negative　coverage　is　better止an　no　coverage．（Stein，1996）
However，　while　negative　advertising　increases　the　likelihood　of　voter
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manipulation，　Ansolabehere，　Iyengar，　Simon，　and　Valentino　suggest　that　it
contributes　to　widespread　voter　disenchantment　with　the　entire　political
process．　According　to　their　study，　negative　political　advertisings　cause　as
many　as　five　percent　of　voters　to　discard　their　intentions　to　vote，　which　is
significant，　since　many　races　are　decided　by　small　margins．　In　addition，
voters　exposed　to　negative　ads　develop　a　cynical　attitude　regarding　the
responsiveness　of　politicians　and　the　election　process　in　general・For
example，　negative　advertising　was　a　significant　deterrent　to　voting　in　the
l990　Califbmia　gubematorial　election，　in　both　of　the　state’s　1992　US　Senate
races，　and　in　the　l　993　mayoral　election　in　Los　Angeles（Ansolabehere，
Iyengar，　Simon，　and　Valentino，1994）．　Attack　ads　can　be　used　to　weaken　the
opponent’s　image，　but　they　may　reduce　voter　tumout　as　well．
　　Moreover，　there　is　some　evidence　that　passing　negative　or　misleading　ads
through　news　coverage　gains　weight　and　credence，　and　fUrther，　actually
amplifies　the　emotional　effects．　For　the　viewer，　these　ads　are　no　longer
partisan　ads　but　now　the　products　of　the　unbiased　and　legitimate　news
system　itself．　ln　order　to　correct　misinformation　in　political　spots，　some
news　organizations（e．g．　Fact　Checks　and　Ad　Watches）take　voluntary
actions　to　investigate　ads　and　publicly　disclose　or　condemn　those　that　are
false　and　misleading．　Michael　Pfau　and　Allan　Louden　investigated　the
effectiveness　of　three　distinct　television　news’ladwatch”formats　in
deflecting　the　inf監uence　of　targeted　political　attack　ads　during　the　l　992
North　Carolina　gubernatorial　campaign．　The　results　clearly　show　that　the　use
of　adwatch　reduces　the　effect　of　attack　ads．　It　produces　a　boomerang　effect，
and　this　effect　is　most　pronoullced　among　female　viewers．　The　results　also
suggest　that　adwatch　programs　do　not　affect　viewer　rating　of　news　shows
（Pfau　and　Louden，1994）．
　　However，　political　advertisements　repeatedly　access　and　appeal　to　viewers
with　impressionistic　directness　whereas　analytic　messages　of”adwatches”
fail　to　grab　attention　and　sometimes　end　up　as　rebroadcasting　the　subject
advertisements　in　critique　format．　According　to　Diamond，　Holkeboer，　and
Sandberg，　exposure　to　an　adwatch　is　tantamount　to　exposure　to　the　ad’s
message，　and　so　the　result　is　usually　the　opposite　of　what　was　intended　by
the　adwatchers（Diamond，　Holkeboer，　and　Sandberg，1996）．　In　addition，　an
adwatch　program　is　usually　done　by　the　arduous　work　of　a　handfU1　of　staff；
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thus，　it　can　not　compete　with　the　speed　and　volume　of　bold　political
messages．　Also，　sponsors　of　political　spots倉eely　utilize　self：serving　data
with　tricks　of　hidden　disclaimers　and　subtle　nuances　making　investigations
ma廿ers　of　s呵ectivity（West，1993；Kerbel，1995；Diamond，　Holkeboer，　and
Sandberg，1996；Ansolabeher　and　Iyengar，1995）．
IV：Political　Advertisements　and　Democracy
　　Some　scholars，　such　as　Darell　West，　contend　that　political　advertising　can
undermine　democracy．　According　to　West，　elections　are　the　lifeblood　of
democratic　political　system　because　in　the　elections　ordinary　people　cast
their　vote　to　determine　who　leads　the　country．　Hence，　the　high　quality　of
information　is　supposed　to　be　provided　during　the　election　process．　This
information　allows　voters　to　hold　leaders　accountable．　West　claims　that
current　political　spots，　nonetheless，　sometimes　manipulate　the　voters，　and
sounds，　colors，　and　visual　presentations　on　television　are　used　in　deceptive
ways．　For　example，　Pat　Buchanan，s　ad　consultants　in　19920ccasionally
speeded　up　or　slowed　down　Bush’s　physical　movements　to　create
unfavorable　impressions　of　the　president．　According　to　West，　campaign
advertisements　are”slicing　and　dicing　the　electorate”in　favor　of　a
candidate’s　strategy（West，1993，　p．225）．　The　public　obviously　feels　the　need
to　improve　the　quality　of　contents　that　spots　deliver．　According　to　the
Yankelovich　Monitor　survey　in　1996，63　percent　of　respondents　wanted　the
govemment　to　regulate　truth　in　advertising（Crain，1996）．
　　Thomas　Patterson　also　expresses　a　concem　that　the　current　l’mass　media
election”is　a　danger　to　democracy．　Patterson　points　out　that　media
simultaneously　serve　both　as　presenters　of　candidates’advertisements　and　as
the　watch　dogs　fbr　the　candidates．　In　this　situation，　the　role　of　the　media
camot　be　held　accountable　fbr　political　campaigns．　Patterson　states：”they
［the　medial　do　not　promote　a　consistent　point　of　view，　and　they　are　not
adequately　accountable　to　the　public曾’（Pa廿erson，1995，　P．333）．　Patterson
proposes　that　a　party　must　be　retumed　as　a　political　utility，　which　is　more
accountable　than　the　media．　Congressional　scholar　Gary　Jacobson　also
expresses　his　concerns　about　the　media－centered　politics　in　Congress．
Jacobson　notes　that　recent　congressional　elections　have　become　candidate－
centered　because　of　the　weak　power　of　the　party　leaders　and　frequent　uses　of
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political　advertisements．　According　to　Jacobson，　media　campaigns　make
incumbents’seats　unsecured，　and　candidates　have　to　pay　excessive　attention
to　constituencies’opinions（Jacobson，1992）．
　　Political　advertisements　also　pose　problems　fbr　inequality　of　political
resources　among　candidates．　If　political　advertising　is　effective，　candidates
with　greater　resources　buy　more　time　and　have　an　impressive　advantage．
Several　countries　such　as　Great　Britain，　Austria，　and　Japan　strictly　prohibit
political　advertising　by　any　individual　candidate　because　of　the　inequality　of
the　candidates，　financial　resources（Faucheux，1995）．　However，　in　the　United
States，　the　ban　on　advertising　will　not　easily　be　realized　because　the
Supreme　Court　mled　that　federal　limits　on　a　candidate’s　expenditures　fbr
advertising　violated　the　constitUtional　guarantee　of　f士eedom　of　speech．
　　Concentration　on　paid　advertisements　orients　politicians　towards　money．
Expendi加res　fbr　campaign　advertising　have　grown　exponentially　over　the
past　fbur　decades　from　l　960　to　2000．　Since　1984，　more　than　half　of　the
budgets　fbr　presidential　campaigns　have　been　spent　on　media　advertising，
with　television　receiving　the　bulk　of　the　expenditures（Wayne，　et　al，1995）．
In　the　2000　presidential　election，＄70．8　million　was　devoted　to　advertising
out　of　the＄135　million　expenditUre　of　the　maj　or　party　candidates（Wayne，
2004，245）．
　　In　addition　to　the　ads　expenditure，　media”consulting”fees　are　soaring．
Nowadays，　no　serious　campaign　is　without　its　consultant，　often　referred　to　as
”handlers．”A　hander　may　command　as　much　as　15％of　the　value　of　his
candidate’s　advertising　costs　as　well　as　a　fee　between　twenty　and　seventy
five　thousand　dollars　fbr　producing　and　placing　the　advertisements
（Diamond　and　Bates，1992；Jamieson，1996）．　Because　of　the　high　mainly－
media　costs，　candidates　are　fbrced　to　devote　a　lot　of　their　time血ndraising　to
the　detriment　of　developing　policy　proposals，　speaking　with　the　people，　and
traveling　around　to　understand　voters曾economic　and　social　needs．
　　Moreover，　political　spots　may　lead　us　to　doubt　the　integrity　of　politicians．
This　view　comes　from　the　very　nature　of　advertising－一一the　packaging　of
血ture　political　leaders　as　if　they　were　consumer　products，　such　as　soap　or
cereal．　From　the　start，　strategies　of　televised　campaign　advertising　are
compared　to　the”marketing”of　consumer　products．　Political　advertising，
however，　might　be　much　worse　than　product　advertising．　To　begin　with，
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political　marketing　is　a　short－term　proposition，　in　which　consumers（voters）
are　subj　ected　to　brief　bursts　of’comm皿ication　that　vanish　without　a　trace
after　election　day．　As　we　previously　examined，　political　ads　are　also
different　because　regulation　over　their　content　is　virtually　nonexistent，　as
opposed　to　other　consumer　products，　which　are　held　to　strict　standard　of
accuracy．　In　addition，　modern　political　spots　tend　to　contain　sophisticated
and　dramatic　images，　which　merge　political　issues　and　feelings．　Thus，　the
real　arguments　behind　the　spots　become　obscure．　Similarly，　conservative
columnist　George　Will　employs　a　view　that　current　political　campaigning
causes　public　mistrust　of　government．　Will　uniquely　suggests　that　this
situation　augments　the　trend　toward　conservatism　because　negative　30－
second　TV　spots　fit　the　conservative　message　of　distrust　of　big　government
much　be廿er　than　liberalism（Will，1994）．
　　Campaign　spots　also　accelerate　the　decline　of　major　parties．　The　advent　of
”mass　media　elections”coincided　with　several　presidential　campaign
refDrms　by　major　parties，　which　also　unexpectedly　weakened　political
recruitments　of　the　parties．　Most　noted　refbrm　was　conducted　by　the
McGovern・・Frasier　Commission　in　Democratic　party　after　the　1972　defeat　in
the　presidential　election．　One　of　the　main　goals　of　the　McGovem－Frasier
refbrm　was　opening　up　the　nomination　process　which　was　then　mostly
closed　and　controlled　by　party　elites．　However，　since　the　first
implementation　of　the　reform　in　1976，　the　influence　of　the　partisan　elites　in
political　recruitment　has　been　significantly　reduced（Polsby，1983）．　The
decline　of　party　control　was　caused　by　dramatic　proliferation　of　the　primary
system　in　which　voters　choose　a　partygs　nominees　fbr　public　o伍ce．　When
the　McGovem－Frasier　reform　was　implemented，　many　states　were　fbrced　to
switch　to　the　primary　system　since　the　guideline　of　the　refbrm　was　difficult
to　adopt　in　the　caucus　system（Polsby　and　Wildalsky，1996；Lengle　1981）．　In
addition，　primaries　became　popularized　through　extensive　and　favorable
media　coverage，　prompting　other　states　to　switch　to　the　primary　system．
After　the　1980s，　primaries　were　more　and　more　scheduled　earlier（”　front－
loading”）because　many　states　attempted　to　be　involved　in　the　initial　and
influential　stage　of　the　nominating　process（Lengle，1981；Mayer　and　Busch，
2004）．Early　primaries，　such　as　the　New　Hampshire　primary，　are　not　only　the
critical　beginning　of　the　drama，　but　far　more　than　the　chronological
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beginning．　According　to　Kathleen　Kendall，　these　early　contests　are
，，р??奄獅奄狽奄盾獅≠戟@beginnings，”whose　character　constructions　will　dominate　the
rest　of　the　campaign（Kendall，1996，30）．　This”front－loading”symptom
fbrces　the　candidates　longer　and　much　costly　advertisement－oripnted
campaigns．　For　example，　Clinton　and　Bush　in　the　l　992　election　spent＄1．7
million　in　political　spots　to　beat　intra－party　opponents　in　the　New　Hampshire
primary，　which　is　the　first　and　one　of　the　most　influential　primaries　in　the
nation．　This　figure　amounted　to　25％of　prenomination　advertising　spending，
although　New　Hampshire　is　only　l％of　the　delegates　to　the　major　parties’
conventions（Kendall，1996；Lichter，　Amundson，　and　Noyes，1993）．　Also，
during　the　presidential　primary　season，　candidates　more　and　more　strongly
attack　their　intra－party　contenders　inundating　them　with　political　campaign
advertisements．　This　intra－party　media　mudsliding　was　much　less　frequent
befbre　the　proliferations　of　primaries　because　the　party　had　more　control
over　the　nominating　Process（Patterson，1994）．
　　In　order　to　reform　the　current　problems　of　political　advertising，　three
possible　reforms　have　been　discussed．　These　three　reform　plans　are　not　easy
to　be　implemented　because　they　all　require　drastic　changes　in　regulations．
And　they　have　been　much　argued　by　p61iticians，　scholars，　and　political
pundits　during　this　ten　years．
　　The　first　possible　refbrm　is　that　candidates　must　appear　in　a　more
substantial　portion　of　the　ad，　such　as　50　to　70％in　the　30　seconds’
commercials．　It　is　generally　tnle　that　the　candidates　hardly　appear　in　the
most　negative　and　manipulative　advertising（e．g．脚Daisy曾曾and”Willie
Horton”）．　Candidates　seem　to　avoid　appearing　in　these　spots　because　they
are　vulnerable　to　the　side　effects　of　the　negative　advertising（Mickiewicz　and
Firestone，1992）．　Needless　to　say，　these　negative　ads　tend　to　be　more　image－
oriented．　Since　candidates　must　appear　in　a　higher　percentage　of　the　ads　in
the　refbrmed　fbrmat，　candidates　have　to　be　more　responsible　fbr　their
opinion　in　the　spots．　Further，　every　advertisement　must　carry　a　clearer
statement　with　bigger　caption　letters　that　the　candidate　is　responsible　fbr　the
ads．　In　this　way，　the　candidates　are　less　likely　disavow　his／her　opinion　later
in　the　reformed　spots．　The　refbrmed　fbrmat　limits　the　manipulative
advertising　and　the　content　of　the　ad　becomes　more　issue－oriented．
Moreover，　the　ads　will　be　more”down　to　earth，”and　they　are　less　likely　to
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contain　dramatic　vignettes．
　　The　second　reform　is　to　set　a　voluntary　spending　limit　on　TV　campaign
advertising．　The　purpose　of　setting　the　voluntary　limitation　is　equalizing　the
candidates’advantages．　If　a　candidate　rej　ects　and　exceeds　the　spending　limit，
then　his／her　opponent　receives　matching　public　fUnds．　The　candidates
eligible　to　require　public　fimds　would　need　to　satisfシcertain　qualifications
such　as　accessibility　of　ballots．　The　voluntary　spending　limit　preserves　as
much　as　possible　the　candidates曾freedom　to　conduct　the　campaign　of　their
choice　without　contradicting　the　Supreme　Court　ruling　about　a　candidate，s
expenditures　fbr　advertising．
　　The　third　refbrm　plan　is　the　allocation　of　”free　airtime”to　political
candidates．　This　free　airtime　refbrm　commands　broadcasters　to　offer　ad
space　to　candidates．　In　recent　presidential　elections，　some　television　news
media　actually　attempted　to　provide　several　fヒee　presentations　in　their　news
shows．　The　effects　of　these　trials　were　possibly　tiny．　Thus，　some　pundits，
such　as　Ron　Faucheux，　the　publisher　of　Campaign（蔓Elections，　claim　that
the　free　time　ad　is　almost　meaningless　because　of　the　size　of　audience
（Faucheux，1996）．　However，　if　the丘ee　air　time　becomes　institutionalized　in
the　election　process，　these　presentations　will　generate　more　viewers　and
eventually　contribute　to　issue－oriented　discussions　among　citizens．　In　recent
years，丘ee　airtime　was　one　of　the　hottest　issues　in　the　campaign　finance
reform．　For　example，　SenJohn　McCain（R－Ariz．）introduced　a　bill　in　the
lO5th　Congress，　which　requires　broadcasters　to　provide　30　minutes　of丘ee
airtime　during　primetime　and　other　discounts　to　presidential　candidates　who
volunteer　to　abide　by　spending　limits．
V：Condusion
　　Political　advertising　on　television　plays　an　important　role　both　in　selling
candidates’name－recognition　and　in　shaping　agenda．　To　viewers，　these　spots
have　created　an　important　means　ofjudging　candidates　and　be　their　policies，
People　who　would　permit　paid　political　advertising　argue　that　it　allows　a
candidate　direct　access　to　the　electorate．　It　can　be　a　measure　of　the丘eedom
of　the　election　itself　and　of　the　right　of　candidates　to　get　their　messages　to
the　voters　with　few　or　no　restrictions　on　setting　and　format．　However，　the
final　impact　of　such　advertising　is　hard　to　measure．　In　a　campaign　so　much
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is　happening　simultaneously－speeches，　debates，　media　coverage，
advertising－that　it　is　almost　impossible　to　assess　the　impact　of　a　single
isolated　phenomellon　like　TV　advertisement．　Television　advertising　is　not
the　be－all　and　end－all　of　a　political　campaign．　It　is　only　one　component－
and　a　terribly　expensive　one－一　of　an　election　contest．　In　the　United　States，
television　advertising　accounts　fbr　the　largest　single　expenditure　in　a
political　campaign．　It　increases　the　need　and　time　to　raise　money．　Moreover，
negative　political　advertising　may　well　generate　a　boomerang　e脆ct　that　will
hurt　the　popularity　of　the　candidate．　Thus，　while　advertisements　on
television　have　some　basic　benefits，　their　positive　impact　on　a　candidate’s
campaign　is　very　much　exaggerated．　Under　the　current　circumstances，
attempt　to　ban　advertising　is　unrealistic　because　it　provides　direct　appeals　to
the　voters，　and　a　paid　political　advertisement　has　already　become　a　regular
and　vital　part　of　the　campaign　fbr　office　in　the　United　States．　However，　some
kinds　of　refbrm，　such　as　a　limitation　on　spending　and　tighter　fbrmat
regulations，　have　been　seriously　discussed　in　political　circles．
Notes
　lThe　spOt　by　Bush　suppOrters　featUres　a　mug　shot　of　Willie　Horton，　an　Aftican　American
　　　　prisoner　who　had脚aCaucasi㎝wo㎜w㎞1e　he　was　on　a　weekend蝕10u帥丘om
　　　　Massachusetts　jail．　It　obviously　aimed　at　those　who　were　fea血1　of　crime，　of　A肋an
　　　　Alnericans，　and　of　liberals　and　their四do－good”social　policies，1abeling　Dukakis，　the
　　　　Democratic　candidate　and　the　govemor　of　Massachusetts，　as”sofトon　crime　liberal”
　　　　（Sabato　1993）．
2The　spot　a血cks　I）Ukakis，s　environmental　policy　in　Massachusetts，1沁inting　out血at
　　　　Boston　Harbor　has　been　polluted　unln（e　Dukakis，s　promises．　It　shows　the　Harbor　in
　　　　”Vibrunt　color　on　oil－1ike　water　floa舳accumulation　ofwaste”（Jamieson　1996，470）．
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（日本語要約）
アメリカの選挙スポットの効果と問題点
前　嶋　和　弘
　アメリカでは、テレビにおける選挙CM（選挙スポット）は大統領選挙だ
けでなく、連邦議員選挙や州知事選挙など、さまざまなレベルの選挙で広く
利用されており、選挙活動の中心に選挙スポットが位置している。選挙スポ
ットは、候補者にとって、自分の名前を一般に広く知らしめるだけでなく、
自分の政策をPRし、相手候補と争う道具となる。そのため、選挙スポット
が選挙戦の争点を設定する機能がある。さらに、政治に関する知識が少ない
層にとって、選挙スポットが果たす啓蒙機能も少なくない。
　しかし、有権者は選挙期間中に他の多くの情報の影響の中にさらされてい
るため、選挙スポットが直接、視聴者の投票行動に与える効果については、
限定されている。この傾向は特に大統領選で顕著である。また、自己正当化
が目立つ「売らんかな」的な選挙スポットの内容に対して、「防衛機能」が
働くため、視聴者は選挙スポットそのものに注目しなくなるという現象もあ
る。相手候補を中傷する「ネガティブ・スポット」については、選挙や政治
そのものに対する嫌悪感を生んでしまうため、投票率の低下につながるとい
う研究もある。さらに、政党に頼らない候補者個人の選挙戦術として、選挙
スポットを放映するケースが多いため、「選挙運動の個人化」を生んでいる。
これは国民の政党離れとも無関係ではない。
　このように、選挙スポットは広く利用されているに関わらず、様々な問題
点を抱えている。現在、アメリカ国内でも様々な改革案が出されているが、
実行に移すのはいずれも難しいのが現状である。
